IN RE TICKNOR'S ESTATE.

isiana in the administration of justice, so far as those laws were
applicable to the condition of things, and were not repealed or
modified by any order of the governing power. The right of the
governing power to make laws by which the government should
be administered, and which of course should be the guide and
rule of its officers and courts in administering, was never doubted,
much less was any question of its right in this respect entertained
by the courts, themselves the creations and servants of the same
power by the same right.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
IN RE BENAJAR TICKNOR'S ESTATE.'
The rule that an unincorporated association cannot take by devise or gift, applies only to land or to personalty where a permanent trust is created. There
is no incapacity to take an absolute, unconditional bequest of personalty.
The case of Owens vs. Missionary Society, 14 N. Y. Rep. 380, dissented from.
The statute of Michigan, relating to religious corporations, does not apply to
foreign religious corporations.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.-Benaah Ticknor made his will, providing for
the investment of certain moneys, in which his widow was to
have a life interest. Upon her death that fund was bequeathed
in equal shares to the Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society
of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States, the
American Bible Society, the Seaman's Friend Society, the Society for the Relief of Widows and Orphans of Deceased Clergymen of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Boston, Massachusetts, and the Tract Society of the Protestant Episcopal Church
in the United States. The first four societies are incorporated
under the laws of New York and Massachusetts. The Tract Society is a New York society, not incorporated until quite recently,
and since the application to the Probate Court.
The executors having applied to the Probate Court of Washtenaw County, where the will was admitted to probate, showing
1 We are indebted for this
New York.
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the decease of the widow, and asking for an order of distribution, these legacies are contested by the next of kin as rendered
invalid by the statute of 1855, entitled "An Act concerning
churches and religious societies, establishing uniform rules for
the acquisition, tenure, control, and disposition of property controlled or dedicated for religious purposes, and to repeal chapter
52 of the Revised Statutes, 1 C.L. 660." The clauses supposed
to be violated are the latter part of section 22 and sections 24
and 25. It is provided in section 22, that no corporations for
religious, ecclesiastical, educational, or charitable purposes, shall
be recognised as existing by the common law, canon law, or by
prescription, or in. any other manner, except by express statute
of the state. Sections 24 and 25 require certain formalities and
conditions to be complied with before a devise or bequest to religious orders or societies, or to be controlled by them, can be
maintained.
In order to determine whether this statute reaches the case
before us, we must look beyond isolated phrases to the general
tenor and design of the act itself. It has always been a rule of
construction (and our constitutional provisions requiring the purpose of a statute to be indicated by its title is but an extension
of this rule), that the application of particular provisions is not to
be extended beyond the general scope of a statute unless such
extension is manifestly designed. Legislatures, like courts, must
be considered as using expressions concerning the thing they
have in hand; and it would not be a fair method of interpretation to apply their words to subjects not within their consideration, and which if thought of would have been more particularly
and carefully disposed of. We think this statute, when compared
with the state of things before existing, has a plain and consistent meaning, which will not allow us to regard it as embracing
foreign associations, unless they undertake to exercise their peculiar functions within our territory, as they might do if lawfully
incorporated here. The general purpose of the statute is to
revise the previous legislation concerning the incorporation of
religious societies; to require them to become organized in such
a way as to have suitable trustees representing the societies, and
more especially to cast off all pretence of corporate capacity
derived from any authority or system of laws not known to our
courts, and not subject to our supervision so far as all the temporal possessions of the Church should be concerned. Having pro-
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vided that all religious bodies assuming corporate existence and
the control of property must be organized in such a way as is
deemed safe and expedient under our statute, the law then provides, in the same spirit, to prevent their obtaining gifts from
private bounty by any means which would prevent the calm and
deliberate action of the donor when in full and uncontrolled dominion of his will and mental faculties. It is impossible to read
the statute together without seeing its object to be the restriction
and regulation of religious bodies exercising their functions here,
and being therefore entirely within our legislative control so far
as their temporal rights are concerned.
Section 22 is chiefly devoted to an entire prohibition of the
exercise of corporate functions by persons not incorporated by
our law. And it is hardly necessary to suggest that we cannot
impute to the legislature a design of reaching matters abroad
and beyond our jurisdiction, or of denying corporations of other
states rights which they have derived under lawful authority
there. Section 23 prohibits the recognition of the canon or other
ecclesiastical law, as a rule for the acquisition and government
of property, again clearly relating to its operation in the state,
because we have nothing to do with acquisitions abroad. To hold
that after a series of sections consistently framed for the regulations of religious corporations here, the sections regulating particularly the form and validity of donations for the benefit of
such bodies were designed to reach a further class not in the
remotest way referred to before, would be to introduce an element of incongruity, and to impute a degree of carelessness
which the elaborate care previously evinced, shows could not have
existed. It is undoubtedly true that some of the evils aimed at
by the statute may be accomplished by the importunities of entirely foreign corporations. But such instances cannot be very
frequent, and their remedy would be more appropriately introduced elsewhere. And language should be very clear, indeed, to.
justify us in finding it in the statute before us. The receipt of
money under a will, and the institution of legal proceedings to
recover it, cannot be regarded as the exercise of corporate franchises, such as are forbidden by the statute to any but domestic
corporations. The law refers to such acts as a corporation is
organized to perform, and not incidental proceedings having no
necessary bearing upon the peculiar corporate operations. We
think the foreign corporations mentioned in the will are entitled
to receive the bequests made in their favor.
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The bequest to the Tract Society is resisted on the further
ground that an unincorporated association has no legal capacity
to take.
We do not feel called upon in this case to examine into the
vexed question of the extent of the judicial power of equity over
charities. This will does not set apart property for any permanent purpose, nor does it purport to create any trust. It bequeaths certain money to an association without instruction concerning its use, and of course the money must be considered as
devoted to its general uses. The articles of the society do not
require money to be funded, but leave its application to be made
at any time. The extraordinary powers of Chancery have seldom, if ever, been applied except to regulate permanent trusts
requiring corporate or quasi corporate succession to expend the
income of a fund designed to be perpetual. And the only question before us, is whether the legatees are so clearly designated
that the executor can find them and pay the money into the proper hands, so as to be exonerated.
It has been settled that a devise of land cannot be made to an
unincorporated society by name. Mr. Kyd, referring to Lord
COKE, says that this rule did not always exist, and that the reasons
for its adoption re not easily ascertained : and remarks, ,Perhaps, we must be satisfied with stating the rule as it is, without
attempting to accountfor its origin:" 1 Kyd on Corp. 5, 6, 7.
It is equally well settled, and for obvious reasons, that where
an association is' required to manage a permanent trust, it can
only do so by corporate succession; for an unincorporated body
has no means of keeping up its existence except by the consent
and continuous agreement of new parties, and it is at all times
liable therefore to become dissolved.
But there is very little authority for the claim that an unincorporated body of persons may not take an unconditional bequest
of personalty not charged with any permanent trust. It is said,
indeed, in Owens vs. The MissionarySociety of the H..E.Ohurch,
14 N. Y. 380, that nothing is better settled than that a devise or
bequest to an unincorporated association is in general void as
well in equity as at law; and upon this remark, without further
reasoning, it was held in that case without the interposition of
some charitable use which might give a ground for the peculiar
interposition of the Chancery jurisdiction over charities, a bequest to such a society was void. But the authorities referred to
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in sustaining this dictum, all related to devises or permanent
trusts. Nor have we been able to discover any authority giving
color to such a sweeping assertion. On the contrary, the law
recognises the acts and contracts of unincorporated associations
gs among the commonest things coming before the courts, whether with or without trustees and officers. Partnerships and unincorporated joint stock companies do a large proportion of the
business of every community. They take and transfer personal
property by their associate name, and no one has ever doubted
their capacity to take by bequest that which they may take by
contract: -De Aazar vs. Pybus, 4 Yes. 644 ; Stubbs vs. Sargon,
3 M. & Or. 507.
"Where bequests are made to unincorporated charitable associations generally, and not for permanent purposes, the English
courts have always upheld the bequests. They have not been
sustained on the ground that they came within the extraordinary
charitable jurisdiction. On the contrary, it has been held that
when made for the general purposes of the society, the public
have no concern with the legacies, and the Attorney-General is
not a proper party, the money being at the entire and uncontrolled disposal of the association. Whereas, if the bequests are
made upon permanent uses, the society cannot take the money,
and the Attorney-General must be before the court, and a scheme
must be prepared placing the trust in other competent hands:
Wellbeloved vs. Jones, 1 S. & S. 40; Wilson vs. Squire, 1 Y. &
0. 654; Walker vs. O-hilds, Ambler 524, 1 Jarman on Wills. In
other words, a bequest of money generally to an unincorporated
society, is placed on the' same footing, so far as regards its right
to take to its own uses, as if it were incorporated. Similar bequests
have been maintained where there has been no association whatever, but where the will pointed out the means of identification.
Thus, a bequest to the inhabitants of Tomhaven Row, in the
parish Letteney, ,was held sufficiently certain; and when their
names were ascertained, the money was ordered to be paid to
them :" Rogers vs. Thomas, 2 Keen 8. The Inns of Court in
England are mentioned by Mr. Kyd as remarkably ancient unincorporated associations, which have retained their real estate by
an ingenious succession of joint tenancies : 1 Kyd on Cor. 6, 7.
Itis well known that their valuable libraries and pictures are to
a considerable extent derived from bequests. The extent, of
VOL. X1I.-18
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their influence, and the fact of its legal recognition by the English courts, are familiar to all. And if an incorporation were
deemed at all necessary for the preservation of their valuable
personal property, no one can doubt but that it would have been
obtained long ago. That these bodies are not corporations is
recognised fully by the authorities in Sharswood's notes to 1 Bl.
25; Tomlyn's Law Dictionary, " Inns of Court."
The great body of American decisions fullysustains the validity
of bequests to unincorporated societies. It is true several cases
refer to them as charities ; but it is not pretended that any
American Court of Chancery can create 'a scheme which shall
give corporate succession; and if these bodies can take at all, it
can only be because there is no inherent incapacity. The cases.
were fully cited on the argument, and it is not necessary to refer
to them here. We have found no satisfactory authority which
shows why an association capable of clear identification is not as
capable of receiving a simple pecuniary bequest for lawful purposes, as a partnership of purchasing a stock of goods. The
incorporation of the Tract Society since this controversy was
begun, rendered it unnecessary to inquire into the names of the
various officers.
The bequest must be paid over to the corporation. The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed with costs. And an order
must be entered requiring a distribution among all the legatees
named, and that direction be sent to the Probate Court accordtingly. •
to an unincorporated society, for public
or charitable uses, will be protected
where the object is sufficiently specified
-England and in the United States, and and is capable of being carried into
as the American authorities are not effect according to the intention of the
cited in the case before us, we propose donor: Potter vs. Chapin, 6 Paige's Ch.
briefly to refer to the principal of them, Rep. 650. So a devise of $1000 to an
without intending, however, to discuss unincorporated society by name, was
the vexed question of equitable juris- held good in King vs. Woodhull, 8 Edw.
Oh. 79. See, also, Wright vs. Meth.
diction over charities.
In New York, a legacy of money to Episcopal Church, 1 Hoffman Ch. 203;
an unincorporated town, for the pur- Shotwell vs. Mott et al., 2 Sandf. Ch.
pose of building a town-house, was held 46; Banks vs. Phelan, 4 Barb. 89, and
valid, on the ground that it was a cha- Hornbeck's Executor.vs. Am. Bible Sority, by Chancellor KENT: Coggeshall ciety, 2 Sandf. Ch. 133, where Vicevs. Pelton, 7 Johns. Ch. 292; and it was Chancellor SANDFORD appears to regard
said that a gift or bequest of personalty the question as entirely settled, saying,

The validity of devises and bequests
.to unincorporated societies has been
the subject of much discussion both in
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"there is nothing in the point that the
unincorporated societies are incapable
of receiving the bequests to them."
In Owens vs. Missionary Society, 14
N. Y. 385, however, the Court of Appeals went into an elaborate examination of the subject, and arrived at a
conclusion which appears very materially to conflict with the cases previously
decided in that state as well as elsewhere. The case was of a bequest of
personalty absolutely to an unincorporated society by name. The Surrogate
found as a fact that the society claiming, which had been incorporated since
the death of the testator, was the legatee intended by the will, and this fact
was assumed in the Court of Appeals.
SZLDEN, T., in delivering the opinion
of the court, stated the question to be
simply as to the validity of the bequest,
the subsequent incorporation of the society not affecting the point in issue.
He then cites authorities for the position that a bequest to an unincorporated society is in general void, and
proceeds to argue that there cannot be
an absolute bequest which will be good
as a charity, for a charity implies a
trust. In legal contemplation, "charity" and "charitable use" are convertible terms. Therefore, a bequest
simply to a society by name, can only
be supported by implying a trust for the
known objects of the society. He then
discusses, with great clearness and
learning, the nature of the jurisdiction
over charities, and shows that the
courts of New York have only those
powers over the subject which are exercised by the Court of Chancery in
England independently of the prerogative of the Crown and the statute of
43 Eliz. c. 4, which is not in force in
New York: "As charitable uses, like
all other uses, comprise a trust as well
as a use, it is obvious that they are liable at common law to two classes of de-

fects, one affecting the trust and the
other the use. To constitute a valid
use, there must be in all cases, first a
trustee legally competent to take and
hold the property; and secondly, a use
for some purpose clearly defined." In
the case before them, therefore, the
court held the bequest void, though the
reasons of the judges were not entirely
identical, and MITCE LL, J., dissented.
This decision is cited as good law in
Beekman vs. Benson, 23 N. Y. 309, but
the exact extent in which it conflicts
with the previous cases has not been
defined. The extract we have made
above speaks of charitable uses "at
common law," but it is presumed from
the course of reasoning and the reporter's syllabus, as well as from the powers of the court, that the equitable jurisdiction is meant to be included, and
therefore that the courts of equity in
New York are hereafter restricted in
the support of charities to cases where
a competent trustee has been named,
and the trust has therefore vested.
This is a material curtailment of their
powers, and is opposed to the general
current of decisions in the other states:
Tappan vs. Deblois, 45 Maine 130, and
the authorities there cited.
In Pennsylvania the courts have from
the earliest times treated religious and
charitable associations with great liberality, and the legislature has on various occasions made specific statutes for
their protection and encouragement.
Thus, by the Act of 1731, all sales,
gifts, or grants of lands or tenements
in trust for churches, schools, almshouses, &c., were ratified and confirmed, and since then all religious and
charitable societies have had a recognised associate and quasi corporate existence in law: Phipps vs. Jones, 8 Harris 260; Brown vs. Lutheran Church, 11
Harris 499. Bequests to unincorporated societies, therefore, have been
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held good: Witman vs. Lex, 17 Serg.
& Rawle 88; Zimmerman vs. Anders,
6 Watts & Serg. 218; even when in
trust for a permanent charitable use
that was in itself indefinite, but where
a power of defining was by the terms
of the bequest vested in the society:
Pickering vs. Shotwell, 10 Barr 23.
And where the bequest was simply to
the society by name, and no purpose
was defined or expressed, it was held
good for the general use or purpose of
the society; STRoNo, J., adopting a
similar view to that of SELDEx, J., in

Owens vs. Miss. Sec., and saying, "his
intent is as plainly manifested as it
would have been if he had expressly
declared that the legacies should be
applied to the very uses for which the
association was created and for which
it exists. We are not to be astute in
defeating his benevolent purpose:"
Evangelical Association's Appeal, 11
Casey 316.
The same doctrines have been held
in most of the other states where the
courts have had occasion to adjudicate
upon them. Thus, in Vermont, where
the decisions appear to rest partly on
the provisions of the constitution of
that state which protects the interests
of all religious societies or bodies of
men "united or incorporated:" Smith
vs. Nelson, 18 Verm. 546 ; Burr's Ex'rs.
vs. Smith, 7 Verm. 278: though an unincorporated church cannot take land
to be held in trust and the interest applied to a charitable purpose: Stone,
Ex'r., vs. Griffin, 3 Verm. 400. So in
Maine: Tappan vs. Deblois, 45 Maine
122. And where a bequest was made
to charitable uses of a permanent fund,
and after testator's death, but before
the trial of the case, the society became
incorporated, the bequest was held
valid: Preacher's Aid Society vs. Rich,
45 Maine 552. So in Iowa, Johnson
et al. vs. Mayne et al., 4 Iowa 180 ; in

Indiana, McCord vs. Ochiltree, 8
Blackfd. 15; and in Connecticut, American Bible Society vs. Wetmore, 17
Conn. 187. And in the Supreme Court
of the United States, in Beatty o al. vs.
Kurtz eta., 2 Peters 566 (where, however, some aid was considered to be derived from the Maryland Bill of Rights),
the same rule was adopted, though the
previous case of Baptist Association vs.
Hart, 4 Wheaton 1, had been regarded'
as negativing the power of the court to'
sustain such bequests, and had in consequence received a great deal of unfavorable criticism: See 2 Kent's Comm.
286, and Potter vs. Chapin, 6 Paige's
Ch. Rep. 650.
It will be seen from the foregoing
examination that the subject has been
uniformly treated as governed by the
law of charitable uses. The case before us is the only one we have found
which discusses on general principles
the capacity of unincorporated societies
to take personalty without reference to
their religious or charitable character.
It is said by CuuncH, J., in Am. Bible Society. vs. Wetmore, 17 Conn. 187,
that by the common law "no title can
be created by deed or devise so as to
vest a present legal interest in any person, natural or artificial, which has no
legal existence," and the principal authorities usually cited in reference to
societies not incorporated, are Sheppard's Touchstone 235, and Coke upon
Litt. 95 a. But the former refers apparently, and the latter certainly, to a
taking in succesion. The words of
CoKE are, "but a co~ledge of religious
persons, chauntry priests, and such
like, that are not lawfully incorporated,
but only consist in vulgar reputation,
have no capacity to take in succession.
Therefore, LITTLETON added materially
' if he had capacitie to take.'" And in
Coke Litt. 3 a, it is said that the parishioners, &c., of Dale "are not capa-
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tion, and should its doctrines be generally adopted, it will have divested
many cases, under an important branch
of law, of doubt and difficulty.
3. T. Mi.

ble to purchase lands, but goods they
are." And it would seem that anciently they could take even lands:
Coke Litt. 3 a; Burr's Ex'rs. vs. Smith,
7 Vermt. 278.
The principal case,
therefore, is worthy of special atten-
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Supreme Court of tMe United States.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, EX REL. THE BANK OF
THE COMMONWEALTH, V8. THE COMMISSIONERS OF TAXES OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK.
The legislature of New York, by chap. 240 of the Laws of 1863, provided in
substance that banks shall be liable to taxation on a valuation equal to the amount
of their capital stoc7 paid in or secured to be paid in, deducting the value of real
estate. Held, that this tax was in substance a tax upon the property of the
bank.
The Bank of The Commonwealth having had a capital actually paid in of
$750,000, had invested about one-fourth of it in real estate and the balance in
the securities of the United States. Held, that the case was governed by the
principles laid down in 2 Black 620, and that so far as the securities of the
United btates were concerned, the act was unconstitutional and void.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
NELSON, J.-This is a writ of error to the Court of Appeals
of the state of New York.
The question involved is, whether or not the stock of the
United States, in which the capital of the Bank of The Commonwealth is invested, is liable to taxation by the state of New York
under an act passed by its legislature 29th April, 1863, or, to
state the question more directly, whether or not that act imposes
a tax upon these stocks thus invested in the capital of the bank ?
A case between this bank and others, in the city of New York,
and the Commissioners of Taxes, came before this court at the
December term, 1862, in which it was determined that the capital of the banks invested in the stocks of the United States were
not taxable under the state laws. The case is reported in 2
Black R. 620. The act of the legislature under which the tax
was then imposed, provided that the capital stock of every company liable to taxation, &c., " shall be assessed at its actual value
and taxed in the same manner as the other personal and real
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estate of the country." It appeared, in that case, that a large
portion of the capital of the banks was invested in United States
stocks and owned by them, and which had been assessed and
taxed by the commissioners. The court, for the reasons stated
in the opinion, held that the tax was a tax upon the stock, and
which, being exempt from state taxation by the settled law of
this court, was illegally imposed.
The statute under which the present case has arisen has been
passed since the above decision, and is as follows: "All banks,
banking associations, &c., shall be liable to taxation on a valuation equal to the amount of their capital stock paid in, or secured
to be paid in, and their surplus earnings, &c., in the manner now
provided by law," &c.
It will be remembered that the previous act, the act of 1857,
directed that the capital stock of the banks should be assessed
and taxed at its actual value. By the present act, as is seen,
the tax is imposed on a valuation equal to the amount of their
capital paid in or secured to be paid in, &c.
Looking at the two acts, and endeavoring to ascertain the
alteration or change in the law from the language used, the intent
of the law-makers would seem to be quite plain, namely, a change
simply in the mode of ascertaining or fixing the amount of the
capital of the banks, which is made the basis of taxation. By
the former the actual value of the capital, as assessed by the commissioners, is prescribed. By the latter the capital paid in, or
secured to be paid in, in the aggregate, is the valuation prescribed.
By the former the commissioners were bound to look into the
financial condition of the banks, into the investments of their
capital, losses and gains, and ascertain the best way they can the
sum of present value as the basis of taxation. By the latter
they need only look into the condition of the banks in order to
ascertain the amount of the capital stock paid in, or secured to
be paid in, and this sum, in the aggregate, will constitute the
basis.
The rule of the present law is certainly more simple and fixed
than that of the former, and much less burthensome to the commissioners or assessors, and in its practical operation is, perhaps,
as just. The former mode involved an inquiry into the whole of
the financial operations of the bank, its several liabilities and its
available resources, often a complicated and difficult undertaking,
and, at best, of uncertain results.
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In order more fully to comprehend the meaning of the language used in the act of 1863, it may be well to refer, for a moment, to the system of the general banking law of 1838, and the
amendments of the same, under which these institutions have
been organized.
Any number of persons may associate to establish a bank under
this law, but the aggregate amount of capital stock shall not be
less than $100,000.
The instrument of association must specify, among other things,
the amount of the capital stock of the association and the number of shares into which the same shall be divided. It may also
provide for an increase of their capital and of the number of the
associates, from time to time, as may be thought proper.
The association is required to deposit with the superintendent
of the bank department stocks of the state of New York or of
the United States, or bonds and mortgages upon real estate, at a
prescribed valuation, before any bills or notes shall be issued to
it for circulation as currency. Nor can it commence the business
of banking until these securities have been deposited to the
amount of $100,000. The public debt and bonds and mortgages
are to be held by the superintendent exclusively for the redemption of the bills and notes put in circulation as money until the
same are paid. And it is made the duty of the superintendent
not to countersign any bills or notes for an association to an
amount, in the aggregate, exceeding the public debt or public
debt and bonds and mortgages so pledged.
It is true, the associations are not obliged to invest more of
their capital paid in in stocks, or stocks and bonds and mortgages,
than is required as security, with the superintendent, for the bills
and notes delivered for circulation as currency. The investment,
however, cannot be for a less amount than $100,000. It may
exceed that limit. But this reference to the system shows that
however large the amount of the capital of the association, fixed
by its articles and paid in, the whole or any part of it may be
lawfully invested in these stocks. The whole need not be used
as a pledge for the redemption of the bills or notes as currency,
as the issuing of these for circulation is only one branch of the
business of banking. The banks, therefore, were but obeying
the injunction of the law in investing the capital paid in in these
stocks.
Now, when the capital of the banks is required or authorized
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by the law to be invested in stocks, and among others, in United
States stock under their charters, or articles of association, and this
capital thus invested is made the basis of taxation of the institutions, there is great difficulty in saying that it is not the stock
thus constituting the corpus or body of the capital that is taxed.
It is not easy to separate the property in which the capital is
invested from the capital itself. It requires some refinement to
separate the two thus intimately blended together.
The capital is not an ideal, fictitious, arbitrary sum of money
set down in the articles of association, but in the theory and
practical operation of the system, is composed of substantial pro.
perty, and which gives value and solidity to the stock of the
institution. It is the foundation of its credit in the business
community.
The legislature well knew the peculiar system under which
these institutions were incorporated and the working of it; and
when providing for a tax on their capital at a valuation, they
could not but have intended a tax upon the property in which
the capital had been invested. We have seen that such is the
practical effect of the tax, and we think it would be doing injustice to the intelligence of the legislature to hold that such was
not their intent in the enactment of the law.
We will add, that we have looked with some care through the
statutes of New York relating to the taxation of moneyed corporations, including the act of 1823, in which the first material
change was made in the system, the act of 1825, the revision of
1830, the acts of 1857 and of 1863, and it will be seen, in all of
them, that the tax is imposed on the property of the institutions,
as contradistinguished from a tax upon their privileges or franchises. Since the act of 1825, the capital has been adopted as
the basis of taxation, as furnishing the best criterion of the value
of the property of which these institutions were possessed. Under their charters or articles of association, this amount was paid
in or secured to be paid in by the stockholders or associates, to
the corporate body, or ideal person, constituting the capital stock
to be managed and disposed of by directors or trustees in furtherance of the objects and purposes for which the institutions were
created. It constituted the fund raised by the corporators, with
which the institutions began and carried on the particular business in which they were engaged. The injunction of the charters which required this capital to be paid in, made it necessarily
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substantial property. The amount might fluctuate according to
the good or ill-foftune of the enterprise. It might become enhanced by gains in business, or diminished by losses; but, whether the one or the other, the tax in contemplation of the legislature and of the charters, was imposed on the property of the
institution consisting of its capital. In case of a permanent loss,
a remedy against grievous taxation was always at hand, by a
reduction of the capital.
Having come to the conclusion that the tax on the capitalof
the Bank of the Commonwealth is a tax on the property of the
institution, and which consists of the stocks of the United States,
we do not perceive how the case can be distinguished from the
cases heretofore before the court, and reported in 2 Black 620.
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the cause
remitted with directions to enter judgment in conformity with
this opinion.
We had occasion to review this case
when it was before the Court of Appeals
in New York, 3 Am. Law Reg. N. S.
535, and to dissent from the position
that the tax was valid and not in conflict with the United States Constitution,
p. 558. The view then taken coincided
with that now enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States, that
the tax is substantially a tax on property. This decision apparently disposes of all evasions by the state legislatures of the principle that the instruments of theU. S. government are not the
subject of state taxation. There would
seem to be no mode by which a state tax
can affect the holder of U. S. securities.

The present case hints at the taxation of a bank franchise as presenting
a different class of considerations. It
is possible that a legislature may require a bank as a condition of its exercising special privileges, to pay specified sums of money, without reference
to the question whether its entire property may be invested in United States
securities. Such a tax is not likely to
be imposed, and the present decision
practically secures to banking institutions, so far as they are holders of
United States securities, immunity from
state taxation.
T. W. D.

Supreme Court of Minois.
WILLIAM L. ROSS ET AL. vs. ADAM G. INNESS.
Probable cause, as a defence in an action for malicious prosecution, is a reasonabre ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused vaS
guilty of the offence charged.

ROSS ET AL. vs. INNESS.
A want of probable cause cannot be inferred from malice, though malice may
be inferred from want of probable cause. In an action for a malicious prosecution, the burden is on the plaintiff to show affirmatively, by circumstances or
otherwise, that the defendant had no ground for the prosecution. What circumstances would suffice, cannot be specified, but among them doubtless would stand
out prominently the good character of the party accused.
That the defendant, in an action for malicious prosecution, acted under advice
of counsel in making the arrest complained of, cannot avail, unless there was a
full statement of all the facts to the advising counsel-all the facts of which the
party was in possession, or which, by reasonable diligence, he could have ascertained; nor unless the arrest was made in consequence of such advice, and not
in pursuance of a previous fixed determination to make such arrest.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
BRn.ESE, J.-This was an action on the case for malicious prosecution, brought in the Superior Court of the city of Chicago, by
A. G. Inness against William M. and John H. Ross, composing
the mercantile firm of Win. M. Ross & Co., doing business in
that city.
The case has been three times tried by juries, and three verdicts obtained by the plaintiff with heavy damages. The first
verdict was set aside by the. court in which it was rendered. The
judgment on the second was reversed by this court, and the cause
remanded. The result of the remand was another trial, and a
verdict for plaintiff for ten thousand dollars and judgment
thereon. This judgment is brought here by appeal on bill of
exceptions, and a reversal prayed on various grounds.
The charge on which the plaintiff was arrested was embezzlement. That while a clerk in the employment of the defendants,
it was his duty to receive, safely keep, and disburse the moneys
of the firm. That during the continuance of his employment
he was entrusted with the sum of one hundred and sixty-six dollars by the firm, which, without the knovledge or consent of the
firm and against their will, he feloniously converted and appropriated to his own use, and embezzled from the firm, with the
intention to steal the same. He was examined on the charge,
and acquitted.
The question for determination in the several trials had, was
as to the criminal intent of the plaintiff in taking the moneys.
That he took the money, and appropriated it to his own use, the
plaintiff never at any time denied: he claiming the right to take
it, as the balance of his salary, as cashier, due him from the
firm.
The defendants insist, and have always insisted, that there was
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probable cause for the arrest, and further, that before they proceeded to take any steps towards plaintiff's arrest, they obtained
the advice of eminent counsel, and acted upon that. If either
of these grounds exists, and was proved, the verdict was wrong,
and should have been set aside. If they do not exist, then
another question will have to be considered, and that is, the
amount of the damages.
These grounds of defence will be examined. Probable cause
is defined by this court to be a reasonable ground of suspicion,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man in the belief, that the person accused is
guilty of the offence charged: R ichey vs. McBean, 17 Ills. 65;
Jacks vs. Stimpson, 13 Id. 701; Hurd vs. Shaw, 20 Id. 356. If
probable cause for the arrest exists, malice on the part of the
prosecutor cannot be considered-it weighs nothing. The onus
is upon the party bringing the action, to show that the criminal
prosecution was the offspring of malice and without any probable
cause to justify it ; that the prosecutor had no sufficient reason
to believe the accused guilty. The want of this element, probable cause, is the main ground of this action, and it must be
clearly shown; and though malice may be inferred fro& the want
of probable cause, a want of probable cause cannot be inferred
from malice. The burden is on the plaintiff to show affirmatively, by circumstances or otherwise, that the defendant had no
ground for the prosecution-no such reasonable ground for suspicion sufficiently strong in itself, as to warrant a cautious man
in believing that the person arrested is guilty of the offence
charged.
In addition to the case above cited, reference is made to the
case Israel vs. Brooks, 23 Il1. 575, on this point. In this last
cited case this court said, what those circumstances may be, cannot be specified; but we would think, among them, the good
character of the party accused, would stand out prominently.
That is a strong fact, if known to the accuser, to ward off suspicion, to weaken a belief, he being a prudent and cautious man,
in the guilt of the suspected party.
A glance at the leading facts must satisfy any one that no probable cause existed for the arrest. The'plaintiff had been in the
employment of the defendants more than four years, and had an
established character for honesty. During that time the daily
receipts of the concern averaged fifteen hundred dollars, not one
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dime of which was unaccounted for by the plaintiff. A charge
was made against him of a debt due from his brother, which the
defendants claimed was to be paid by the plaintiff, and which
they sought to set up against his salary. Denying the agreement, or any understanding that his brother's debt was to be
charged against his salary, but insisting it was to come out of
certain insurance money, he, on leaving the establishment, appropriated to the payment of salary due, the sum of one hundred
and sixty-six dollars out of moneys of the firm in his hands.
This was known to the defendants, and known, too, that he
claimed the right to do so. He was not bound by the rule of
the house, that sums over five dollars should be paid out on
checks only drawn either by Win. M. Ross or by the plaintiff,
indorsed by the other partner, as he was not a clerk in the meaning of that rule, nor was that rule always observed, for repeated
instances are shown in which it was departed from, even as to
the clerks. The defendants knew perfectly well, when they
caused the plaintiff to be arrested for embezzlement, that he took
the money as his legal right for the balance of his salary, and
that he denied the right of defendants to pay his brother's debt
out of his salary; that he retained the money as salary, and
made the proper entry in the book against himself, and pointed
it out to John H. Ross at the time, insisting all the while on his
right to take the payment of his salary. An embezzling thief
would not so act. There is not one circumstance shown in the
case on this point, tending to make out probable cause, but every.
thing to dissipate such a notion.
On the other point, that the defendants acted under the advice
of counsel, that defence can never avail unless there has been a
full statement of all the facts to the advising counsel, all the
facts of which the party is in possession, or which by reasonable
diligence he could have ascertained: Ash et al. vs. Marlow, 20
Ohio 119. In Stevens vs. Passett, 27 Maine 266, it was held, if
a person, with an honest wish to ascertain whether certain facts
will authorize a criminal prosecution, lays all the facts before
one learned in the law, and asks his deliberate opinion thereon,
and the advice obtained is favorable to the prosecution, it will go
far in the absence of other facts to show probable cause, to negative malice in an action for malicious prosecution; but if it ap-

pears that the party withheld material facts within his knowledge, or which, in the exercise of common prudence, he might
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have known, the opinion which he invokes in his defence cannot
avail him. To the same effect is the case of Bliss vs. Wyman
et al., 7 Calif. 257, and Hfendrick vs. Cyssent, 10 Humph. 291.
Many other cases might be cited on the point, but it is unnecessary, as the bare statement of the principle proves its correctness.
That the defendants withheld from their counsel several important facts, is fully proved. In the first place, they sought to
impress upon Mr. Blackwell that the plaintiff was an ordinary
clerk, and subject to certain rules of the establishment governing the clerks in obtaining money; that the plaintiff had violated
those rules in such a way as to make him chargeable with the
crime of embezzlement. The fact was, and must have been
known to the defendants, that the plaintiff was not in that category at all; that his name never was on the pay-roll of the
clerks, and was not and had not been subject to the rules as to
his pay which governed the clerks as to their pay. By this their
couns6l was misled. The plaintiff's true position was very important to be known by Mr. Blackwell, and if stated to him as it
really was, it is not probable this sagacious lawyer would have
seen any indication of embezzlement in the act done. Mr.
Blackwell's idea undoubtedly was that plaintiff was but a clerk,
and subject to the rules as to payment governing them. Again,
the defendants did not tell their counsel, if plaintiff was subject to this rule, that it was violated daily. If counsel had
been informed of that fact, he would scarcely have said plaintiff
was guilty of embezzlement for violating* it for the purpose
alleged.
Again, the defendants did not inform their counsel that the
plaintiff was the assignee of his brother, against whom they held
a balance, and that plaintiff claimed he was to pay this balance
out of the assigned effects and not out of his salary. This fact
was never communicated to him, nor did the counsel ever hear of
it until after the examination before the magistrate: then for the
first time he heard of the assignment. The defendants also stated
to their counsel that it was agreed between them and the plaintiff that if he would guarantee the debt of his brother it was all
right, and they would furnish him goods; and that in pursuance
of that agreement an entry had been made to plaintiff's account,
with his knowledge and consent, which was a ratification of the
agreement.
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Alexander Inness testifies he never heard of such a thing as a
guarantor for his purchase; that he was never required to give
any security, nor was any guaranty given by anybody to his
knowledge, and never heard that plaintiff had become his guaranty. He says that the entry of a credit as paid by plaintiff on
his account, of $189.42, on 23d January, 1858, was made by
plaintiff at his special request as an act of friendship, and was
confined to that single transaction.
Mr. Murray, the common uncle of the parties, had a conversation with the plaintiff about this matter, at the request of John
H. Ross, when plaintiff told him to remind John Ross that when
he took the money he had told him of it, and charged himself
with the amount on the books. This was communicated to John
H. by Mr. Murray, but it was not communicated to counsel.
These were important facts, and should have been revealed to
counsel. The whole truth, all the facts, should have been freely
disclosed. As they were not, the defendants were not permitted
to seek refuge under the advice given on a garbled statement of
the facts. If justice was the sole object, if the laudable desire
of bringing a culprit to punishment moved the defendants, if no
wicked spirit stirred them, they would have disclosed the minutest
fact to their counsel. Had they told him what has been proved
on this trial, as shown in this record, it is not possible to believe
Mr. Blackwell would have advised a criminal prosecution.
This ground of defence entirely fails. But there are some
facts going to show that the defendants did not act on the advice
of counsel, but had made up their minds to prosecute the plaintiff criminally before counsel had been consulted.
Mr. Murray testified that soon after the plaintiff left the service of the defendants, John H. Ross, one of the defendants,
sent for him on particular business. He went to the store and
met John, who told him that plaintiff had taken one hundred and
sixty-six dollars from the desk-that it was the same as stealing
it-and he was resolved on prosecuting him criminally for it. He
also said he had a telegram from his brother, from New York,
requesting him to arrest plaintiff if he did not pay back the
money. He said he would bring him back if he should go to
Texas. Witness was advised to see him, and tell him he would
have him arrested if he did not pay the money back. On this
being communicated to plaintiff, he told witness to tell John Ross
he would not pay back the money; that he took it as the balance
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of salary due and coming to him, no more: and to remind John
Ross that when he did take the money he had told him of it,
and charged himself with it on their books; and as to attempting
to arrest him, they could not do it without swearing falsely, and
if they did, he would take them up for it.
This was stated to John Ross, and he replied, " he would arrest
him in a short time, and we will see how he will like to be sent
to Joliet." The witness warned Ross that he had better be cautious; that by arresting him he might place plaintiff in a better
position than he was in before. Ross replied to this, " Nonsense,
how could he fight such a house as this." Afterwards, on the
return of William Ross from New York, the same witness states
that he said to witness, plaintiff had had the presumption to take
one hundred and sixty-six dollars from the desk, against the wellknown regulations of the store, and that he was resolved to make
an example of him; he would let him see if he could play such
tricks with impunity, and if he did not pay it back he would ruin
him; he would mark him, that he would never get a situation in.
Chicago as long as he lived; that they would arrest him and take
him before -a police magistrate, &c. On being asked what he
wanted plaintiff to do, he replied, he wanted him to pay back
that money. Witness then stated, if desired, he would see plaintiff once more and tell him of his determination. Saw plaintiff
accordingly, when he said, no threats should compel him to pay
back what was justly his own, no matter from what quarter they
came; that he only took what was due to him and no more; that
the money taken was the balance of salary coming to him, and to
remind Ross that he never promised to pay the balance of his
brother's account; that whatever passed on the subject depended
upon the proceeds of his brother's assignment, and did not
amount to a promise. This was communicated to William Ross,
but he did not communicate it to his counsel.
These facts show a previous determination by defendants to
arrest plaintiff on a criminal prosecution before they had consulted counsel, and that consultation was a mere cover 'o carry
out their ovn wicked intentions. These facts go far to show that
the defendants did not intend to be governed by the advice of
counsel, whatever it might be. They had formed a previous determination to prosecute him at all hazards for a crime which
they had every reason to know the plaintiff had not committed.
The evidence fully establishes malice on the part of the de-
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fendants. In addition to what we have cited above as evidence
of malice, one of the defendants, on the investigation before the
magistrate and after the plaintiff had been discharged, said, -If
anybody comes to me to inquire after plaintiff's character, I will
say that he stole $166 from me, and that he is a thief and a
liar." Now, as to question of damages, there have been three
verdicts, finding heavy damages in each. Apart from the principle that courts seldom disturb verdicts on the ground of excessive
damages, after three trials, all having the same results, it must
be a very strong case, indeed, in which this court, in an action
sounding wholly in damages, will interpose to set the verdict
aside: Wolbrecht vs. Baumgarten, 26 Ill. 291.
This court has held, that a verdict should not be disturbed on
account of excessive damages in cases of tort, unless it be probable, from the amount of the damages assessed, that the jury
has acted under the influence of prejudice or passion: Schlencker
et al. vs. Risley, 3 Scam. 484. To judge from the amount of
damages assessed, whether the jury have acted from prejudice or
passion, the circumstances of the case must be well considered.
Here in this case was a causeless attempt by a wealthy house to
blast forever the character of a young man just entering upon
the active pursuits of life, with no endowments but his talents,
fair character, and uniform integrity. To him these were a priceless possession, in comparison with which the amount awarded by
the jury is trifling indeed. We cannot perceive, in the amount
assessed, sufficient indication that in finding it, the jury were
actuated by prejudice or passion, or any unworthy motive. It
was a powerful house making a heavy charge against a poor and
friendless young man, placed in peculiar circumstances, which, if
true, would have consigned him forever to a doom more dreadful
than the grave, and forced him to become a wandering outcast
on the face of the earth. There is no standard by which damages
in such a case shall be measured. Much is committed to the
intelligence of the jury. Much faith is reposed and must be, in
their sease of right and justice.
We cannot say they have gone astray, and therefore cannot
disturb this verdict. A powerful house, possessed of extensive
means, which one of the defendants thought it would be the
greatest temerity for the plaintiff " to fight," in vindication of
his honor and integrity, by their own wrong act and most unjustifiable conduct, and by the decision of a jury of their own selec-
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tion, has placed the plaintiff in a position where he can further
illustrate his good qualities and do business on a respectable capital contributed by these very men who sought his ruin through
an infamous charge, which they knew was unfounded. Such is
retributive justice.
The judgment is affirmed.

United States -DistrictCourt, District of Maryland.
THE UNITED STATES VS. THE SCHOONER FRANCIS HATCH.
Under the Act of Congress of 13th July, 1861, sect. 5, goods forming the
cargo of a vessel proceeding to a point in the insurrectionary states, are liable
to forfeiture only while in trantu.
And the vessel only while the contraband cargo is on board.
But under the regulations made by the Secretary of the Treasury by authority
of the Acts of 13th July, 1861, 20th May, 1862, and 2d July, 1864, a vessel engaging in trade with the insurrectionary districts, is liable to forfeiture even
after the termination of the prohibited voyage and the discharge of the contraband cargo.
The imposing of such forfeiture is within the power to make regulations con, ferred on the Secretary of the Treasury by the Acts of Congress.
Congress has the constitutional right to confer such power, though quasilegislative, on the Executive.
Even if it be necessary for Congress itself to exercise such power, it may be
considered to have ratified and adopted such regulations by the Act of 2d July,
1864, sect. 3.
Therefore, where a vessel bad been engaged in prohibited trade, but before
the libel was filed, had completed her voyage and discharged her cargo, a forfeiture was decreed by virtue of the regulations established by the Secretary
of the Treasury.

.December Term, 1864.

Libel for forfeiture.

Addison and Thayer, for the United States.
Carter and 2Bidgeley, for the claimants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GILES, J.-The libel in this case has been filed by the District
Attorney of the United States, in which it is charged that the
schooner Francis Hatch has conveyed passengers and merchandise from the city of New York to that part of the state of Virginia declared to be in insurrection by the President's ProclamaVOL. XII.-19
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tion, without a license or permit from the proper authorities.
There are some nine counts or articles in the libel, propounding
the matters relied on as grounds or causes of forfeiture; some
drawn under the Act of 13th July, 1861; the others under the
Act of 'May 20th, 1862, and its supplements, and the various rules
and regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury, prepared
under the authority given to him by said acts. At the commencement of the trial of this case, the various claimants of that
part of the cargo which was brought from the city of New York
to this city, having satisfied the court by competent testimony
that they were entirely innocent of any intention to violate any
of the laws of their country, and had no knowledge of the shipment of goods on board the Francis Hatch, to be delivered in
Virginia; and this not being contested by the District Attorney,
the court said, when it passed a final decree in this case, it would
dismiss the libel as to the said cargo, and award the same to the
several claimants. Two claims were filed for the vessel: one by
John P. Williams, claiming to be the owner of the same, and the
other by Messrs. Capron & Co., of this city, claiming as bailees
of the vessel by virtue of a mortgage and power of attorney from
John P. Williams, dated the 14th day of January, 1864, and
also as lien creditors for advances and disbursements, on account
of said vessel, to a large amount.
In the answers filed by the claimants it was expressly denied
that the said vessel had carried either passengers or merchandise
to Virginia, as charged in the libel. - But the testimony showed
that on three voyages made by the Francis Hatch between New
York city and this port, she put out into a yawl-boat passengers
and merchandise, just opposite Gwyn's Island, in the Chesapeake
Bay; that this was always done at night; and on the several
occasions, a man who passed then under the name of Hayden,
was one of the party so put out. Gwyn's Island is in the Chesapeake Bay, quite near to the Virginia shore, and just below the
mouth of the Piankatank River. A large amount of testimony
was given, which it will not be necessary for the purposes of this
opinion to refer to, further than to say: it convinced the court
"hat the passengers and goods so put out from the Francis Hatch
in the Chesapeake Bay, were intended to be landed, and were so
landed, either on Gwyn's Island or on the adjacent Virginia
shore. The evidence also shows that the Francis Hatch was not
seized until she had completed her last voyage in November, and
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when she was moored to the wharf and had been entered at the
custom-house at this port. The counsel for the claimants contended that as the voyage was ended, and the cargo intended for
a state in insurrection, no longer on board; and that as the vessel when seized was not proceeding to a state in insurrection,
there could be no forfeiture in this case under the 5th section of
the Act of July 13th, 1861; and that there can be no forfeiture
of the vessel under the Act of May 20th, 1862, and its supplement, and under the rules and regulations of the Seci'etary of the
Treasury, because by neither the said act nor its supplement is
the vessel declared to be forfeited; and although it is provided
by the several series of regulations adopted from time to time by
the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President, that a vessel violating the same shall be forfeited, such a
provision is unconstitutional and void : the Secretary of the Treasury, under the power given to him by the said Acts of Congress
"cto make such rules and regulations as may be necessaryand proper to carry into effect the purpose of said acts," had no authority to forfeit the vessel, &c., and that even if Congress hadintended to impart to him any such authority, they had no constitutional right to do so, as it would be the exercise of a legislative power by a branch of the Executive Department of the
Government.
I think I state thus briefly the substance of the learned and
able defence made in this case by the counsel for the claimants.
They referred the court to two decisions made in this circuit by
the late Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Upon the first
point made by them they cited the decision of Judge TANEY in
the case of the United States vs. 2000 bushels of Wheat, Penn
& Mitchel claimants, made last June, on appeal from the common
law side of this court. That case was this :-The wheat had
been brought to this port from St. Mary's county and consigned
to the claimants, who stored it here for sale, and who made advances on it to the amount of its full value. They had no reason
to suppose that it was not grown in this state, although it appeared
from the evidence that it was brought from Virginia across the
Potomac into' St. Mary's county before being shipped to Baltimore. It was in store here ten days before it was seized. Ib
was tried before a jury in this court, and I instructed the jury
that, if they found these facts, their verdict must be for the
claimants. From this decision the Government took an app.eal

-
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to the Circuit Court, and the decision of this court was affirmed.
In deliver;ig his opinion Judge TANEY construes the Act of July
13th, 186t, as follows. His language is: ,,Taking the different
provisions of this law together, it appears to me that the forfeiture attaches to the goods when they are on their passage, and
adheres to them while they remain in that condition, that is, in
transitu between the forbidden places, and no longer." In a
subsequent part of his opinion, he says : , The words , together
with the vessel or vehicle conveying the same' confirms this conclusion. The vessel is not forfeited unless the unlawful cargo is
actually on board; and it would be a strained and unreasonable
construction of these words to forfeit the vessel when it had a
lawful cargo not liable to forfeiture. The vessel is forfeited when
and while it is carrying on commercial intercourse between the
United States and the interdicted places. The forfeiture adheres
to the vessel while she is thus engaged, and no longer. It is
only when the cargo is unlawful the vessel conveying the same is
forfeited; and when that cargo is landed and separated from the
vessel it cannot be said to be conveying the same, and is not forfeited by any provision of the said law."
Now, beside the respect which I should entertain for anyopinion to which he gave the sanction of his great name, he was the
presiding judge in this circuit; and his decisions, until reversed
by the Supreme Court, are the law of this court and binding on
it. In pursuance of that decision there can be no forfeiture of
the Francis Hatch under the 5th section of the Act of July 18th,
1861. Now can this vessel be forfeited for a violation of the
rules and regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury ? To oppose such forfeiture the counsel for the claimants have referred
to the other decision of Judge TANEY, mentioned above, which
was made in the case of the United States vs. A Box of -Dry
Goods, Geo. W. Carpenter, claimant. Now, in that case, the
dry goods were intended to be carried from this port to the
claimant, in Charles county, in this state, and were seized in this
port by the collector on the charge that a fraud had been committed in obtaining the permit; and that in such case the goods
were forfeited by the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury, as well as by the Act of May 20th, 1862.
The Chief Justice held in that case that neither -Congress nor
the Secretary of the Treasury had any constitutional authority
to place any restrictions upon the internal trade of Maryland, as
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this was a subject-matter beyond the jurisdiction of Congress,
who, under the Constitution, had power only , to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and amonq the several states, and
with the Indian tribes." He held, therefore, that so far as the
regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury applied to the trade
between Baltimore and the lower counties of this state, they
were void; and that, therefore, the box of dry goods seized in
that case must be restored to the owner. But the question that
I am now called upon to decide has not yet been decided by any
of the Federal courts, so far as I have been able to learn. No
case has been cited by the counsel on either side, and I have
heard of none. It is presented, therefore, for the first time, and
is a question of great importance, to which I have given my most
careful deliberation. Neither the Act of 20th May, 1862, nor
that of the 2d July, 1864, provide for a forfeiture of the vessel.
But the Act of 20th May, 1862, contains a provision forfeiting
any goods, wares, or merchandise transported or attempted to be
transported in violation of the said act, or of any regulation of
the Secretary of the Treasury, established in pursuance of the
authority given to him by said act. But both acts authorize the
Secretary of the Treasury to establish all such general or special
regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect the purposes
of the acts. The language of the last act (July 2d, 1864) is,
," That the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the
President, shall make such rules and regulationsas are necessary
to secure the proper and economical execution of the provisions of
this act." And one of the provisions of said last-mentioned Act
was, "That no goods, wares, or merchandise shall be taken into a
state declared in insurrection, or transported therein, except to
and from such places and to such monthly amounts as shall have
been previously agreed upon in writing by the CommandingGeneral of the department in which such places are situated, and
an officer designated by the Secretary of the Treasury for that
purpose." Four series of rules and regulations have been made
and published by the Secretary of the Treasury, and approved
by the President, viz. : Those of the 28th August, 1862; those
of the 31st of March, 1863; those of the 11th September, 1863,
and lastly, those of the 30th July, 1864. 1 have not been able
to obtain a copy of the first series, but the three last contain provisions for the forfeiture of a vessel found violating any of the
said regulations. I shall quote (as far as it may be necessary)
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only the provisions or regulations of the last series.

They were

approved by the President, July 30th, 1864.
1st regulation is as follows: ,No goods, wares, or merchandise will be allowed to be transportedto, from, or within any state
or part of a state, under restriction or declared in insurrection,
except under permits, certificates, and clearances, as hereinafter
provided." The 45th regulation is: "All vessels, boats, and
other vehicles used for transportation, violating regulations and
local rules, and all cotton, tobacco, or other products or merchandise shipped or transported or purchased or sold in violation
thereof, will be forfeited to the United States."
It is not pretended in this case that the "cFrancis Hatch" had
on any of the three voyages mentioned, any permit to land goods
in Virginia.
Now, the first question is, what power did Congress intend to
give to the Secretary of the Treasury, when it authorized him to
make such rules and regulations as are necessary to secure the
proper execution of the provisions of the act they passed? Did
they authorize him to enforce the due observance of the regulations he might establish by penalties? This will depend upon
the true meaning and import of the word " to regulate." Worcester, in the last edition of his dictionary, defines the verb ,to regulate" as follows: - to reduce to order, to direct, to rule, to govern,
to conduct," &c. And in the Constitution of the United States,
framed by some of the greatest men-of their day, and a paper
that will command the admiration of all time, this word "reguIn article 1st, section 8, subsection
late" is used several times.
3, power is given to Congress " to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states and with the Indian tribes."
Under which grant of power Congress has, from time to time,
passed various laws 'to regulate our foreign and coastwise trade,
and enforced their due observance with heavy penalties. No -one,
I believe, has ever questioned the constitutionality of such laws.
Again, in same section, subsection 14, power is given "cto make
rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces." Under this grant of power Congress passed and adopted
,The Articles of Brar," which, in many cases in time of war,
provides the punishment of death.
And in article 4th, section 3, power is given to Congress "cto
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting
the territory or other property belonging to the United States."
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Under this grant of power Congress has, for more than seventy
years, punished all crimes committed in the several territories of
the United States until their admission as states into the Union.
Without dwelling further upon this point, it appears to me, that
the word " regulation" means something more than the mere preparation of a set of rules In reference to any particular subject.
It includes the power to enforce the due observance of those rules
by penalties and forfeitures. But, say the learned counsel for
the claimants, while Congress possess this power themselves,
they cannot impart or delegate it to any branch of the Executive
Department of the Government. Now, I'am free to admit that
this is a question of some difficulty. But the rule which governs
courts of justice, when deciding upon the constitutionality of an
act of a co-ordinate department of the Government, is, "that
unless the contrary is clearly demonstrated, the presumption
must always be in favor of the validity of such act. Now, we
have four series of regulations to govern the commercial intercourse between the states in insurrection and the rest of the
United States. The three first of these regulations were prepared and sanctioned by the late Secretary of the Treasury, a
gentleman who is now placed at the head of the Judiciary of the
United States; and the last regulations prepared by the present
Secretary of the Treasury-both gentlemen of large experience
in the public service. In a case of doubt, therefore, it is the
duty of the Federal Judiciary to uphold and maintain these regulations; as it would be their imperative duty, if their unconstitutionality was clearly demonstrated, to refuse to recognise or
enforce them. I grant that the construction I give to the word
c regulations" includes the exercise of a quasi legislative power.
But this is nothing new in the history and operations of our Government. The President, by and through the Secretary of War,
prepared the regulations for the government of the army; many
of which prescribe punishments and define offences not specified
in the articles of war. And the Supreme Court, in 4 Howard
117, say : "cAs to the army regulations, this court has too repeatedly said that they have the force of law," &c. In this state, as
in most of the states, its Constitution or Bill of Rights contained
a provision that the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial powers
of the Government ought to be separate and distinct from each
other. Yet in a late case which came before the Court of Appeals of this state, in which the constitutionality of the Baltimore

296

UNITED STATES vs. SCHOONER FRANCIS HATCH.

Police bill came under review, a bill in which the power of ap.
pointing the commissioners was reserved to the legislature, the
court maintained the validity of the said law, although the article
in the Bill of Rights to which I have referred, was much relied
upon in the argument. And also in this state, the legislature
has again and again granted to municiral corporations of its own
creation the power of imposing taxes, one of the highest powers
belonging to the legislative department. And the exercise of
this power by the municipal corporation has been sustained. This
provision in the Bill of Rights to which I have referred is
intended, no doubt, to prevent one department of the Government from usurping the power confided to either of the other
departments. It was so held in the case of Crane vs. Meginnis,
1 Gill & Johnson 463, and in the case of The Regents, &c., vs.
William, 9 Gill & Johnson 410; and is not to be construed as
a prohibition upon the Legislative Department from authorizing
a branch of the Executive Department to exercise quasi legislative powers in a prescribed case. Speaking of this article in the
Bill of Rights, Justice Tuox, in delivering the opinion of the
court in the Police bill case, to which I have referred (15 Md.
457), says: " But this article is not to be interpreted as enjoining a complete separation between these several departments.
Practically, it has never been so in any of the states in whose
fundamental law the principle has been attested." And he further says: " Entire practical separation was not designed." And
that it was designed to engraft this principle in our system " only
so far as comported with free government, as an inhibition upon
the exercise by one department of powers conferred on any other
by the Constitution." And in the case of The State of Pennsylvania vs. The Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Company, 18 Howard 429, the Supreme Court sustained Congress in the exercise
of what was certainly a quasi judicial power.
The Supreme
Court in a previous case (13 Howard 518) had decreed that the
Wheeling bridge was a nuisance, and should be removed. Since
the passing of said decree Congress had, by the Act of August
31st, 1852, declared the said bridge to be a lawful structure in
its present position and elevation. A bill was filed to enforce
the decree for the removal of the bridge, and the Supreme Court
(in 18 Howard 429) refused to enforce it, and sustained the action
of Congress in the premises. Sustaining the law, it is true, upon
the ground that it was the exercise by Congress of the power to
regulate commerce between the states.
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There is another view of this question which seems to me to be
very clear. If the authority of the Secretary to enact these
regulations and enforce their observance by forfeitures, be doubtful, Congress possessed the power to ratify and adopt them. This
doctrine is discussed by Judge GIIER, in delivering the opinion
of the Supreme Court in the prize cases reported in 2 Black's Reports 679. 2 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 334. The question in those
cases was the validity of the blockade proclaimed by the President
before the meeting of Congress in 1861. That learned judge held
that, if it were necessary to the technical existence of a war, that
it should have a legislative sanction, such sanction was found in
the various laws subsequently passed by Congress for carrying on
the war. Now Congress, by the 3d section of the Act of July 2d,
1864, provides for the disposition of money received from the sales
of captured property, &c., or from fees collected under the rules
and regulations made by the Secretary of the Treasury, and approved by the President respectively, 28th August, 1862, 31st
March, 1863, and 11th September, 1863. Now each of these
series of regulations contained a provision forfeiting any vessel
engaged in their violation.
I am of the opinion, therefore, that the regulations of the
Secretary of the Treasury, to which I have referred, are valid,
and that by them this vessel must be forfeited to the United.
States, and I will sign a decree to that effect. As I said before,
the evidence has convinced me that this vessel, on her last voyage,
conveyed passengers and goods on their way to Virginia, who
reached there; that this was done with the knowledge of Hayden
(whose true name is Snowden), and who was himself on board,
and who was the real owner of the " Francis Hatch," the name
of John P. Williams being used for the purpose of deception. I
shall not now pass upon the claim of Messrs. Capron & Co. for
advances under their power of attorney. This is not the proper
time to do so. That claim, if it exists and can be maintained,
must be filed under and subject to the requisitions of the Act of
Congress of March 3d, 1863. I shall not pass upon it now for
another reason: Mr. Capron is, I understand, held in custody,
charged with a violation of certain provisions of the Act of July
2d, 1864, and may be indicted by a grand jury and tried on the
charge. I would not, therefore, discuss the facts proved in relation to his connection with this vessel at this time, lest I might
do him injustice, or prejudice any defence he might be able to
make on such trial.

